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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama announced the restoration
of full diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba after nearly fifty-five
years of economic embargo and diplomatic isolation.' The tumultuous
relationship between the two countries dates back to the 1959 Cuban
Revolution led by Fidel Castro which established Cuba as a revolutionary
socialist state. 2 As the United States fought the Cold War against the Soviet
Union, Castro's regime "increased trade with the Soviet Union, nationalized
U.S.-owned properties, and hiked taxes on American imports [, and]3 the
United States responded with escalating economic retaliation" that eventually
led to a full economic embargo. 4
Despite President Obama's rapprochement announcement, the Cuban
embargo nevertheless remains in full force and effect today.5 The embargo
prohibits the transfer of property rights between persons and entities subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and Cuba. 6 Among these prohibited
transfers are those of trademarks.7
Because the embargo prohibits the transfer of property rights from domestic
entities to Cuban entities, well-known Cuban marks receive little protection in
the United States.8 Although both the United States and Cuba are members of
international intellectual property treaties, 9 U.S. courts consistently hold "that
U.S. domestic law codifying the embargo outweighs the treaty obligations of the
United States in conforming to international intellectual property law."'10 The
I Timehne: U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELAIONS (last visited Mar. 29, 2016),
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/timeline-us-cuba-relations/p32817; CfR Backgmunders: U.S.-Cuba
Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/
cuba/us-cuba relations/pI1113 [hereinafter Backgrounders].
2 Backgrounders, supra note 1.
3 Id
4 Id; see Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2015) (codifying the trade embargo
against Cuba); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021
(2015) (tightening the existing trade embargo against Cuba).
5 See supra note 4.
6 31 C.F.R. 5 515.201 (2015).
7 Id. 5 515.311.
8 Mindy Pava, The Cuban Conundrum: Proposing an International Trademark Registrj for Well-Known
Foreign Marks, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 631, 632 (2011).
9 Id.
10 Id; see also Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 481 (2d Cir. 2005)
("[L]egislative acts trump treaty-made international law when those acts are passed subsequent to
ratification of the treaty and clearly contradict treaty obligations." (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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inability of Cuban entities to register their well-known marks in the U.S. allows
U.S. entities, particularly those in the cigar and rum businesses, to register their
own versions of well-known Cuban marks and market them throughout the
United States."
In theory, Cuban entities owning well-known Cuban marks, despite lacking
registrations in the U.S., could seek relief against U.S. entities registering and
marketing their own versions of well-known Cuban marks under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Paris Convention) or
the 1929 General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial
Protection (Pan-American Convention). Both treaties provide exceptions to
the principle of territoriality characterizing U.S. and international trademark law,
which holds that "trademark rights are bound by national borders.' 12
The famous marks doctrine is the exception to the principle of territoriality
set forth by the Paris Convention.13 "The famous marks doctrine stands for the
principle that [i]f a mark used only on products or services sold abroad is so
famous that its reputation is known in the United States, then that mark should
be legally recognized in the United States."'1 4 The doctrine stands for the
proposition that "[i]f a junior user were to use a mark in the United States that
is confusingly similar to the foreign famous mark, then there would, by
definition, be a likelihood of confusion among United States customers."' 5 In
practice, however, claims for relief under the famous marks doctrine are rarely
successful.16
In response to whether Cuban entities owning well-known Cuban marks
unregistered in the U.S. may seek relief under the famous marks doctrine,
federal circuits are split on the applicability of the famous marks doctrine to
federal trademark law.'7 The Ninth Circuit recognizes the famous marks
doctrine as incorporated into the Lanham Act codifying federal trademark law,
11 See Pava, supra note 8, at 633.
12 Christine H. Farley, The Pan-American Trademark Convention of 1929: A Bold Vision of
Extraterritorial Meets Current Realities, in TRADEMARK PROTECFION AND TERRITORIALITY
CHAT I PNGFS IN A .i.ORIA. FCONOMy 57, 57 (Irene Calboli & Fdward .Lee eds, 2014).
13 Article 6bis, Convention Done at Stockholm Juy 14, 1967; T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 21 U.S.T. 1583
(Sept. 5, 1970) (allowing the owner of a well-known foreign mark to seek refusal of registration or
the cancellation and prohibit the use of a lesser-known domestic mark that is confusingly similar
to the well-known foreign mark).
14 Kristin Zobel, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known Foreign Marks Receive, at
Trademark Protection Within the United States?, 19 DEPAuL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL PROP. L. 145,
145-46 (2008) (quoting 5 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCART14Y ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETION § 29:4 (4th ed.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 29:4.
16 See Pava, supra note 8, at 635 ('Thus, in rare cases, a trademark can receive protection even if
the mark has failed to be used in commerce within the borders of the United States.').
17 Zobel, supra note 14, at 145-46.
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whereas the Second Circuit does not.18 Moreover, regarding Cuba-specific
trademark disputes, the Second Circuit has held that even if the famous marks
doctrine were incorporated into the Lanham Act, a Cuban entity owning the
well-known, unregistered foreign mark would be nevertheless barred from
seeking relief under the doctrine because of the embargo.19 The Second Circuit
reasoned that "[t]he Embargo Regulations do not permit [a Cuban entity] to
acquire the power to exclude [a U.S. entity] from using the mark in the United
States" 20 because acquiring the power to exclude via the famous marks doctrine
would constitute a prohibited transfer of property rights to a Cuban entity in
violation of the embargo.21 The Second Circuit further reasoned that the U.S.'s
commitment to enforcing the Cuban embargo trumps its commitment to
complying with international intellectual property law set out in international
treaties in which both the U.S. and Cuba are members.2
The Pan-American Convention, of which the U.S. and Cuba are both
contracting states, also provides exceptions to the principle of territoriality in
the form of priority rights.23 The goal of the convention was to resolve
fundamental differences between U.S. trademark law and that of other Latin
American countries.24 U.S. trademark law considered trademark rights to arise
out of use of a mark, whereas Latin American countries considered trademark
rights to arise only out of registration of a mark.2 Therefore, in Latin American
countries, "unless and until a mark was registered, it [was] available for use by
anyone, and if it [was] registered, it [was] incontestable." 26
Article 7 of the Pan-American Convention entitles a trademark owner in a
contracting state "the preferential right to use such mark.., or priority to
register.. ." in another contracting state.27 Under Article 7, a trademark owner
18 See Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); ITC Ltd.
v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 163 (2d Cir.), certified question accepted, 8 N.Y.3d 994, 870 N.E.2d
151 (2007), and cerftified question answered, 9 N.Y.3d 467, 880 N.E.2d 852 (2007); see also Zobel, supra
note 14.
19 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 481 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Lee
Ann W. Lockridge, Honoring International Ob'gations in U.S. Trademark Law: How the Lanham Act
Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks (and Why the Second Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1347, 1373 (2010).
20 Empresa, 399 F.3d at 481 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Lockridge, supra note 19, at 1373.
21 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 481.
22 See general id (citing multiple cases supporting the proposition that "to the extent that the
Paris Convention, standing alone, might pose an irreconcilable conflict to the Regulations, the
latter will prevail'); supra note 13.
2 Farley, supra note 12, at 58.
24 Id. at 61.
25 Id
26 Id at 62.
27 Id. at 64.
5
: Caught between a Mark and a Hard Place: Resolving U.S.-Cuban Trad
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2016
J. INTELL PROP. L
in a contracting state may challenge an interfering mark's use or registration in
another contracting state upon showing that the defendant had knowledge of
the mark's existence and continuous use, and upon complying with the
domestic requirements of the contracting state in which the actionable conduct
took place. 28 Article 8 of the Convention extends Article 7's priority right to
allow for cancellation of an interfering mark 29
Because Congress has not expressly modified or abrogated the U.S.'s Pan-
American treaty obligations or followed the withdrawal provisions set forth by
the treaty, our obligations remain in full force and effect 3 0 With Latin
American entities now owning valuable, globally recognized trademarks, the
likelihood of encountering Article 7 and 8 claims in U.S. courts is no longer
nonexistent. Rather, U.S. courts can expect to be confronted by such claims
brought by Cuban entities if and when the embargo is repealed.
Congress is unlikely to repeal the embargo in the near future.31 However,
recent normalization between the U.S. and Cuba raises questions concerning
how to resolve ownership disputes between U.S. and Cuban entities over well-
known Cuban marks registered within the United States if and when repeal
does occur. Analysis of doctrinal intellectual property and international
relations questions surrounding U.S.-Cuba trademark disputes provide
Congress with guidance when determining what new legislation to enact when
lifting the embargo. Such legislation must reconcile ownership of pre- and
post-embargo U.S. registrations of well-known Cuban marks. Moreover, any
proposed legislation will also need to reconcile the U.S.'s treaty obligations to
Cuban entities under the Pan-American Convention's priority provisions with
obligations to U.S. registrants of conflicting marks.
This Note argues that the solution for reconciling issues of conflicting
trademark ownership between U.S. and Cuban entities following repeal of the
embargo lies in a modified concurrent use registration scheme designed to
specifically and exclusively address the unique predicament affecting U.S. and
Cuban entities. Part II discusses applicable legal doctrines, international
treaties, and U.S.-Cuban embargo history. Section A analyzes the famous marks
doctrine and its place in international intellectual property treaties and United
States federal law. Section B discusses the priority rights set forth in the Pan-
American Convention, which act as an additional exception to the traditional
principle of territoriality. Sections C and D discuss the history of the embargo,
28 Id.
29 Id at 66.
30 Id. at 69.
31 After the Thaw: What's Next in U.S.-Cuha Relations?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec.
19, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/cuba/after-thaw-next-us-cuba-relations/p35864 [hereinafter After
the Thaw].
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its use as a means of skirting international treaty obligations, and the potential
for international retaliation as a result.
Part III begins by explaining the predicaments U.S. and Cuban entities will
face if and when the embargo is repealed. Sections A and B examine concurrent
use provisions as currently set forth in the Lanham Act and studies the
administrative barriers preventing successful application of the current
provisions to resolve U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes. Section C proposes
modified concurrent use provisions designed to resolve U.S.-Cuban trademark
disputes specifically and successfully. Part IV concludes this Note by finding
that the solution to resolving U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes lies in the
proposed modified concurrent use provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
This section discusses applicable legal doctrines, international treaties, and
U.S.-Cuban embargo history. Section A analyzes the famous marks doctrine
and its place in international intellectual property treaties and United States
federal law. This subsection begins by providing background on the doctrine's
underlying principles as expressed in international treaties, and concludes with a
discussion of the doctrine's treatment in U.S. courts and by the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board as it applies to federal trademark law. Section B discusses the
priority rights set forth in the Pan-American Convention that act as an
additional exception to the traditional principle of territoriality. This subsection
first discusses the significance of the treaty's priority provisions. This
subsection concludes with an explanation of the treaty's force of law in the U.S.
and the embargo's impact on the treaty's lack of enforcement. Sections C and D
discuss the history of the embargo, its use as a means of skirting international
treaty obligations, and the potential for international retaliation as a result.
A. THE PARIS CONVENTION'S FAMOUS MARKS DOCTRINE
1. The Famous Marks Doctrine and Princle of Territoriality. One of the basic
tenets of American trademark law is the principle of territoriality. 32
Territoriality "[recognizes trademarks] as having a separate existence in each
sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally recognized as a mark. '33
Owners of foreign marks have no rights to use their marks in the United States
or to prohibit the use of their marks by others within the United States without
32 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir.), certifed question accapted
, 
8 N.Y.3d
994, 870 N.E.2d 151 (2007), and certified question answered, 9 N.Y.3d 467, 880 N.E.2d 852 (2007); see
also McCARThY, supra note 14, § 29:1.
33 MCCARTIH1Y, supra note 14.
7
: Caught between a Mark and a Hard Place: Resolving U.S.-Cuban Trad
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2016
J. INTELL PROP. L
first establishing proof of use and registration of their mark in the United
States. 34 Consequently, federal courts conclude that "it is well settled that
foreign use is ineffectual to create trademark rights in the United States. ' 35 For
a foreign mark holder to assert priority rights to the mark in the United States,
the owner must first either register or use the mark in the United States.36
Because the principle of territoriality "severely limits [a] foreign mark
holder's right to trademark protection in the United States," some courts and
legal scholars recognize the famous marks doctrine as a way to mitigate the
severity of territoriality.37 Under the famous marks doctrine, a well-known
foreign mark would receive protection on the basis of its notoriety within the
United States, regardless of whether the mark is used or registered in the United
States. 38
Because the famous marks doctrine undercuts the established principle of
territoriality, courts disagree with respect to its validity and scope.3 9 The result
is a patchwork of approaches to deciding claims for relief and liability under the
famous marks doctrine. 40
2. The Famous Marks Doctrine in International Treaties and the Lanbam Act.
a. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. The famous marks doctrine is
originally set forth in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (Paris Convention). Allowing owners of well-known
foreign marks to seek the refusal or cancellation of registrations of confusingly
similar marks in the member countries, the provision states:
The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their
legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to
refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a
trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a
translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by
the competent authority of the country of registration or use to
be well known in that country as being already the mark of a
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for
identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when
the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any
34 Zobel, supra note 14, at 147 (footnote omitted).
35 Id. (quoting La Sodete Anonme des Parfums Le Gaon v. Jean Pato, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270
n.4 (2d Cir. 1974)).
36 Id at 148 (footnote omitted).
37 Id (footnote omitted).
38 Id; see also McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 29:4.
39 Zobel, supra note 14, at 148 (footnote omitted).
4 Id
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such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion
therewith. 41
In addition to establishing the famous marks doctrine in Article 6bis, the
Article l0bis of the Paris Convention also holds that member states are "bound
to assure to nationals of such countries effective protection against unfair
competition." 42  The majority view among U.S. courts is that the Paris
Convention is a non-self-executing treaty.43 Even if ratified by two-thirds of
the Senate, non-self-executing treaties "[require] positive legislation in order to
become effective under domestic law."44 Such treaties do not constitute
international legal obligations, and are merely aspirational international
comnitments. 45 Thus, the issue of whether foreign plaintiffs may invoke the
famous marks doctrine under the Paris Convention in U.S. courts turns on
whether the Lanham Act incorporates provisions of the Paris Convention to
make the non-self-executing treaty effective under U.S. domestic law.46
b. Section 44 of the Lanham Act. Disagreement among courts regarding
effectiveness of the famous marks doctrine is rooted in the ambiguity of Section
44 of the Lanham Act.47 Courts agree that the Paris Convention is executed by
the legislative enactment in the form of the Lanham Act, but they disagree as to
whether section 44 incorporates the Paris Convention fully or only partially.48
When considering the validity of the famous marks doctrine, courts turn to
sections 44(b) and 44(h) of the Lanham Act.49 Section 44(b) states:
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention
or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or
the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States
is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the
United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this
section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent
41 Article 6bis, Convenlion Done atStckholmJuy 14, 1967; T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (Sept. 5, 1970).
42 Article 10bis, Convention Done at Stockholm Ju/ 14, 1967; T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (Sept 5, 1970); see
Zobel, supra note 14, at 156.
43 Zobel, supra note 14, at 156; see id. at 156 n.60 (citing multiple court decisions reaching
differing conclusions as to whether the Paris Convention is a non-self-executing treaty).
44 Id. at 156.
45 2 LITIGATiON OF INTERNATIONAL DisPuTs IN U.S. COURTS § 10:6; 74 Am. Jur. 2d Treaties
§2.
46 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 29:25.
47 Zobel, supra note 14, at 157.
48 Id.; see, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 135 (2d Cir. 2007); Grupo Gigante SA
Dc CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004).
49 Zobel, supra note 14, at 157.
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necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention,
treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any
owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapters °
Section 44(b) suggests that U.S. trademark law provisions should be
interpreted in a manner that allows foreign entities to enjoy the full benefits
under the treaties of which their country of origin and the U.S. are both
members.
Section 44(h) refers to the protection of foreign nationals against unfair
competition and states:
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled
to the benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall
be entitled to effective protection against unfair competition, and
the remedies provided in this chapter for infringement of marks
shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing
acts of unfair competition.5'
Section 44(h) suggests that owners of well-known foreign marks whose
countries of origin are members alongside the U.S. in international treaties be
afforded the right to seek refusal or cancellation of registrations of confusingly
similar marks in the U.S. as protection against unfair competition.
Thus, the famous marks doctrine's applicability turns on whether sections
44(b) and (h) incorporate the doctrine in whole or in part.
3. Judicial andAdministrative Treatment of the Famous Marks Doctrine.
a. The Famous Marks Doctrine in Federal Courts. A circuit split has emerged
from disagreement over the famous marks doctrine's validity within domestic
trademark law.52 Circuits determine the validity of the doctrine by determining
whether the Lanham Act incorporated the doctrine in whole or in part5 3
Courts have reached one of two conclusions on the issue: the Ninth Circuit rule
or the Second Circuit rule.5 4
Courts and commentators taking the Ninth Circuit's approach argue that
sections 44(b) and 44(h) fully incorporate the Paris Convention.55 Under this
50 Lanham Act § 44(b); 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2015).
51 Lanham Act § 44(h), 150.
52 Zobel, supra note 14, at 145-46.
53 Id at 166-67.
54 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 29:4.
55 Zobel, supra note 14, at 158; see MCCARTHY, supra note 14 ("In the author's view,
the... famous marks doctrine of Paris Convention Article 6bis is incorporated into United States
domestic law though the operation of Lanham Act 5 43(a), 5 44(b) and § 44(h).').
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approach, foreign mark holders have standing under § 43(a) to assert a claim
under the famous marks doctrine and to win such a claim "if their mark is so
well-known in the United States as to make consumer confusion a likely
threat."5 6
Courts taking the Second Circuit's opposite position-that the sections
44(b) and 44(h) do not provide a basis of relief under the famous marks
doctrine-assert that the Lanham Act only partially incorporates the Paris
Convention. 7 According to these courts, the Paris Convention "does not
create substantive rights for foreign nationals beyond those independently
provided in the Lanham Act.' 58 Rather, the provisions "only require that
foreign nationals should be given the same treatment in each member country
as that country makes available to its own citizens. 5 9 Therefore, the Lanham
Act goes only so far as to provide protection for marks used within the U.S. 60
The Act stops short of providing protection for well-known foreign marks that
have not been used within the U.S.61
i. Ninth Circuit Rule: Famous Marks Doctrine is Incorporated into the Lanham
Act. The Ninth Circuit first found that the Lanham Act incorporated the
famous marks doctrine in Grupo Gigante SA. de C V. v. Dallo & Co.62 The case
involved a dispute over the GIGANTE mark between a large grocery store
chain in Mexico owned by the Mexican company Grupo Gigante and a San
Diego-based grocery store chain owned by the Dallo brothers. 63 The federal
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Mexican company by
finding the GIGANTE mark to be "sufficiently well-known among Mexican-
Americans in Southern California" to have "seniority over the Dallo brothers'
grocery stores in San Diego.' 64 The trial court subsequently granted the
Mexican company injunctive relief barring use of the GIGANTE mark by the
Dallo brothers.65
56 Zobel, supra note 14, at 158; see general Lanham Act § 4 2 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2015)
(detailing civil liability and available remedies for trademark infringement claims).
57 Zobel, spra note 14, at 158; see also Int'l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc.,
252 F.3d 1274, 1277-78 (11th Cit. 2001).
s Zobel, supra note 14, at 158.
59 Id.
60 Id
61 Id.
62 Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 [.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004).
63 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2000),
vacated and remanded sub noma. Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cit.
2004).
64 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 29:4 (citing Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1086).
65 Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found insufficient evidence of the Mexican
GIGANTE mark's renown in Southern California prior to the Dallos brothers'
use of the mark in San Diego beginning in 1995. 6 Despite holding that the
evidence was insufficient to support a summary judgment decision, the Ninth
Circuit nevertheless recognized an exception to the territoriality principle
allowing the owner of a well-known foreign mark to bar the registration or seek
the cancellation of a lesser-known domestic mark.67 The Ninth Circuit stated:
We hold.., that there is a famous mark exception to the
territoriality principle.... An absolute territoriality rule without a
famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and
fraud. Commerce crosses borders. In this nation of immigrants,
so do people. Trademark is, at its core, about protecting against
consumer confusion and "palming off." There can be no
justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into
thinking that they are buying from the store they liked back
home.68
To be "well-known" under the famous marks doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
held that "a mark had to have more than just a 'secondary meaning' in the
relevant U.S. market: it had to be familiar or known to a 'substantial percentage'
of persons in the relevant American market. ' 69 The Ninth Circuit seemingly
requires a foreign mark to have possessed "an intermediate level of recognition
in the relevant U.S. market" at the time of the critical date being assessed for
the purpose of the claim. 70 In addition, the Ninth Circuit stated that factors to
consider when determining whether a mark is well-known include "intentional
copying by defendant and whether U.S. customers are likely to be confused into
thinking that they are buying products or services coming from or affiliated or
connected with the foreign owner of the mark."71
ii. Second Circuit Rule: Famous Marks Doctrine Is Not Incorporated into the
Lanham Act. The Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in ITC Ltd v.
Punchgini, Inc., finding that the Lanham Act does not incorporate the famous
66 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1093.
67 Id. at 1094.
68 Id.
69 MCCARTHY, supra note 14 (referring to Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094).
70 Id
71 Id
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marks doctrine, and creating the circuit split that persists today.72 The court
held, "whatever protections Article 6bis ... might contemplate for famous
marks, section 44(b) grants foreign mark holders covered by these treaties only
those protections of United States law already specified in the Lanham Act."73
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on a lack of clear
congressional intent to incorporate the famous marks doctrine into sections
44(b) and (h).74 The court pointed to "Congress's specificity in dealing with
[foreign] registered marks" under section 44(d) of the Lanham Act.75 The court
found that such specificity "[cautioned] against reading a famous marks
exception into sections 44(b) and (h), which nowhere reference the doctrine,
much less the circumstances under which it would appropriately apply despite
the fact that the foreign mark was not used in [the United States]., 76 The court
also noted that Congress amended the Lanham Act nearly thirty times since the
statute was enacted in 1947 to better illustrate congressional intent with respect
to trademark protection. 7  The Second Circuit reasoned that if Congress
intended for sections 44(b) and (h) to incorporate the famous marks doctrine,
Congress would not have hesitated to amend the Act to reflect such intent.78
The Second Circuit concluded that clearer congressional intent was needed
before it would "construe the Lanham Act to include such a significant
departure from the principle of territoriality." 79
Despite recognizing a persuasive policy argument in favor of incorporating
the famous marks doctrine, the Second Circuit nevertheless held that the issue
was for Congress to decide. 8° It recognized that "the U.S. cannot expect other
nations to protect famous American trademarks if United States courts decline
to afford reciprocal protection to famous foreign marks."'81 A refusal to
incorporate the famous marks doctrine into the Lanham Act could potentially
72 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 145, 163 (2d Cir. 2007), certiied question accepted, 8
N.Y.3d 994, 870 N.E.2d 151 (2007), and certified queslion answered, 9 N.Y.3d 467, 880 N.E.2d 852
(2007).
73 Id. at 163.
74 Id ("fW]e do not ourselves discern in the plain language of [Lanham Act] sections 44(b) and
(h) a clear congressional intent to incorporate a famous marks exception into federal unfair
competition law.").
75 Id. at 164.
76 Id
SId.
78 Id.
79 Id
80 Id at 165.
81 Id (citing De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9307, at *25 (noting that "[r]ecognition of the famous marks doctrine is particularly
desirable in a world where international travel is commonplace and where the Internet and other
media facilitate the rapid creation of business goodwill that transcends borders")).
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open famous American marks up to retaliation abroad.8 2 But as sound as the
policy may be, the Second Circuit found that it did not justify judicial action in a
statutorily regulated area. 83 The Second Circuit concluded "in light of the
[Lanham Act's] comprehensive and frequently modified federal statutory
scheme for trademark protection" that Congress must be the body to consider
whether such policy arguments warrant reading sections 44(b) and (h) to
incorporate the famous marks doctrine.84
b. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the Famous Marks Doctrine.
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (ITAB), a branch of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office that hears and decides opposition, cancellation, and
application proceedings involving trademark registrations, has addressed and
applied the famous marks doctrine in its administrative proceedings. 85 It first
recognized the doctrine in 1983 when deciding Mother's Restaurants, Inc. v.
Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc.86 The TTAB described the famous marks doctrine as
follows:
[p]rior use and advertising of mark in connection with goods or
services marketed in foreign country (whether that advertising
occurs inside or outside the United States) creates no priority
rights in said mark in the United States as against one who, in
good faith, has adopted the same or similar mark for the same or
similar goods or services in the United States prior to the
foreigner's first use of the mark on goods or services sold and/or
offered in the United States, at least unless it can be shown that
the foreign party's mark was, at the time of the adoption and first
use of a similar mark by the first user in the United States, a
"famous" mark.87
That same year, the TTAB actually applied the famous marks doctrine in All
England Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, relying on the doctrine to
rule in the plaintiffs favor.88  The opposer sought to bar the applicant's
82 See generally Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, The Protection of Well-Known Foreign Marks in the
United States: Potential Global Responses to Domestic Ambivalence, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1
(2012).
83 ITCLtd, 482 F.3d at 165.
84 Id.
85 Zobel, supra note 14, at 150.
86 Id at 150-51 (citing Mother's Rests., Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1046,1048 (T.T.A.B. 1983)).
87 Id. (citing Mother's Rests., 218 U.S.P.Q. at 1048).
88 Id. at 151 (citing All Eng. Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd v. Creations Aromatiques, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1069, 1072 (T.T.A.B. 1983)).
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registration of the trademark for "Wimbledon Cologne."8 9 Despite the fact that
the opposer did not market the Wimbledon mark on any goods in the United
States, the TAB found that the foreign Wimbledon mark owned by the
opposer was sufficiently famous based on its use in association with the annual
tennis championship that "purchasers of applicant's cologne would incorrectly
believe that said product was approved by or otherwise associated with the
Wimbledon tennis championships and that allowance of the application would
damage opposer's rights to the mark."9  The famous marks doctrine's
application by the TTIAB therefore suggests its validity in U.S. domestic
trademark law.
U.S. trademark rights and the embargo have created a unique situation for
Cuban marks. Trademark rights in the U.S. vest when a mark owner has used
or registered the mark within the U.S.91 Because the embargo has precluded
Cuban mark owners from using or registering their marks within the U.S., they
cannot show priority rights to the marks that would entitle the Cuban mark
owners to protection under U.S. trademark law despite the prior use and
registration of similar marks in the U.S. by U.S. entities. 92 The famous marks
doctrine would allow a Cuban mark to receive protection on the basis of its
notoriety within the United States, regardless of whether the mark is used or
registered in the United States. 93 Despite its inclusion in an international treaty
to which the U.S. and Cuba are both members, the famous marks doctrine's
role in U.S. trademark law is still undecided.94 The Ninth Circuit and
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board hold that it is incorporated into the Lanham
Act and is thus an available claim for Cuban mark owners challenging the use
and registration of similar marks in the U.S.95 However, the Second Circuit has
reached the opposite conclusion by holding that the famous marks doctrine is
not fully incorporated into the Lanham Act and that, therefore, the Cuban
entities cannot invoke the doctrine to seek cancellation of similar U.S.-owned
marks because the Cuban entities cannot show use of their marks within the
U.S.96 The significance of the circuit split will become more apparent once the
embargo is lifted and more Cuban entities begin challenging U.S.-owned marks
via the famous marks doctrine.
89 Id.
9() Id (quoting AIIEng. Lawn Tennis C/ub, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 1072).
91 Id at 147 (footnote omitted).
92 Id at 148 (footnote omitted).
93 Id.; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 29:4.
94 See McCARThiY, supra note 14, § 29:4.
95 Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004); All Eng.
Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd v. CreationsAromatiques, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1069, 1072 (F.T.A.B. 1983).
96 Zobel, supra note 14, at 158.
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B. PRIORITY RIGHTS OF THlE PAN-AMERICAN CONVENTION
The Pan-American Convention's priority right also serves as an exception to
territoriality. 97 The Convention sought to resolve fundamental differences
between U.S. trademark law and that of other Latin American countries. 98 U.S.
trademark law considered trademark tights to arise out of use of that mark; by
contrast, Latin American countries considered trademark rights to arise only out
of registration of that mark.99 Therefore, in Latin America, "unless and until a
mark was registered, it [was] available for use by anyone, and if it [was]
registered, it [was] incontestable."'' 10 The conflicting view resulted in U.S.
trademark owners feeling that their trademarks were susceptible to attack in
countries where they lacked a registration. 1 1 The U.S.'s "primary objective"
therefore became to secure trademark rights in Latin American countries for
U.S. entities prior to them conducting business in such countries. 10 2 The U.S.
sought to provide trademark rights to U.S. entities "in cases where they did not
register, use or advertise their mark if the party they sought to enjoin had
knowledge of their trademark rights in the U.S. ' '103
The priority right set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the convention serves as
the means for accomplishing the U.S.'s objective. Article 7 states:
Any owner of a mark protected in one of the Contracting States
in accordance with its domestic law, who may know that some
other person is using or applying to register or deposit an
interfering mark in any other of the Contracting States, shall have
the right to oppose such use, registration or deposit and shall
have the right to employ all legal means, procedure or recourse
provided in the country in which such interfering mark is being
used or where its registration or deposit is being sought, and
upon proof that the person who is using such mark or applying
to register or deposit it, had knowledge of the existence and
continuous use in any of the Contracting States of the mark on
which opposition is based upon goods of the same class, the
opposer may claim for himself the preferential right to use such
mark in the country where the opposition is made or priority to
97 Farley, supra note 12, at 58.
98 Id at 61.
99 Id
100 Id at 62.
101 Id.
102 Id at 63.
103 Id
[Vol. 23:293
16
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss2/4
2016] CAUGHT BETWEEN A MARKAND A HARD PLACE 309
register or deposit it in such country, upon compliance with the
requirements established by the domestic legislation in such
country and by this Convention. 104
Article 7 entitles a trademark owner in a contracting state "the preferential
right to use such mark... or priority to register.. ." in another contracting
state. 05 Under Article 7, a trademark owner in a contracting state may
challenge an interfering mark's use or registration in another contracting state
upon showing that the defendant had knowledge of the mark's existence and
continuous use, and upon complying with the domestic requirements of the
contracting state in which the actionable conduct took place. 1' 6 Thus, elements
of an Article 7 claim brought in the United States by a foreign trademark owner
are thus as follows:
(1) plaintiff is the owner of a mark protected in one of the
member states;
(2) defendant is using or applying to register an "interfering
mark" in the United States;
(3) defendant had knowledge of the existence and continuous
use in a member state of plaintiff's mark in connection with
goods in the same class, prior to its use of the mark in the United
States; and
(4) plaintiff has complied with the requirements of the
domestic law in both member states.10 7
"Article 8 extends the priority right of Article 7 to the context of cancelling
an interfering mark."'108 Article 8 states:
When the owner of a mark seeks the registration or deposit of
the mark in a Contracting State other than that of origin of the
mark and such registration or deposit is refused because of the
previous registration or deposit of an interfering mark, he shall
have the right to apply for and obtain the cancellation or
annulment of the interfering mark upon proving, in
accordance with the legal procedure of the country in which
104 Convention & Protocol Between the United States of Am. & Other Am. Repubics for the Prot of Trade-
Marks, 46 Stat. 2907 (Feb. 27, 1931).
105 Id
106 Farley, supra note 12, at 64.
107 Id. at 64-65.
108 Id at 66.
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cancellation is sought, the stipulation in Paragraph (a) and
those of either Paragraph (b) or (c) below.
(a) That he enjoyed legal protection for his mark in another
of the Contracting States prior to the date of the application
for the registration or deposit which he seeks to cancel; and
(b) that the claimant of the interfering mark, the
cancellation of which is sought, had knowledge of the use,
employment, registration or deposit in any of the Contracting
States of the mark for the specific goods to which said
interfering mark is applied, prior to adoption and use thereof
or prior to the filing of the application or deposit of the mark
which is sought to be cancelled; or
(c) that the owner of the mark who seeks cancellation
based on a prior right to the ownership and use of such mark,
has traded or trades with or in the country in which
cancellation is sought, and that goods designated by his mark
have circulated and circulate in said country from a date prior
to the filing of the application for registration or deposit for
the mark, the cancellation which is claimed, or prior to the
adoption and use of the same. 109
Under Article 8, if a foreign mark owner seeks registration in the U.S. and
his application has been refused because an interfering mark is already
registered in the U.S., then the foreign mark owner can seek cancellation of the
previously-registered interfering mark by showing either (1) that the foreign
mark has enjoyed protection in another contracting nation longer than the
interfering mark has enjoyed protection in the U.S. and that the owner of the
interfering mark knew of the foreign mark's use or registration in the
contracting state prior to using or registering the interfering mark in the U.S. or
(2) that foreign mark owner traded or trades with the U.S. and that goods
bearing his mark have circulated and continue to circulate in the U.S. prior to
the use or registration of the interfering mark.110
At the time the Pan-American Convention was adopted, the likelihood of a
Latin American entity filing an Article 7 or 8 claim in a U.S. court was
nonexistent" The issue of encountering interfering marks was only occurring
109 Convention & ProtocolBetween the United States of Am. & Other Am. Repubcs for the Prot. of Trade-
Marks, 46 Stat 2907 (Feb. 27, 1931).
110 Id.
111 Farley, supra note 12, at 67.
[Vol. 23:293
18
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss2/4
2016] CAUGHT BETWEENA MARKAND A HARD PLACE 311
in Latin American countries, and the drafters may have never contemplated the
chance that U.S. courts would confront the priority provisions." 2
The priority provisions of Articles 7 and 8 are considered effective under
U.S. law due to the self-executing nature of the treaty and Section 44(b) of the
Lanham Act. Certain provisions of the Pan-American Convention are self-
executing, meaning that they are "immediately operative in U.S. courts."" 3 Self-
executing treaties require no legislative action other than ratification to become
applicable under domestic law." 4 Because the Pan-American Convention was
ratified by Congress in 1887, its provisions operate as U.S. law as if Congress
had drafted and passed the provisions itself. 15
Additional support for the priority provisions' effectiveness under U.S. law
may be found in Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act Section 44(b) honors the
treaty rights granted to members of contracting states "if those treaty rights are
more extensive than the U.S. trademark act otherwise provides."'116 Therefore,
under Section 44(b), members of contracting states-including those of the
U.S.-receive rights granted to them by the Lanham Act as well as "any
additional rights granted under the convention." 117 Thus, claims under Articles
7 and 8 of the Pan-American Convention may be utilized by both foreign and
domestic entities, the effect of which would "[turn] U.S. trademark law on its
head."'118
For years now, courts have skirted issues regarding the validity of claims
brought by Cuban entities by relying on the embargo to preclude the need to
determine the colorability of such claims. 119 Self-executing treaties and federal
statutes enjoy equal status under U.S. law pursuant to Constitution's Supremacy
Clause.120 Courts must interpret federal statutes "so as not to conflict with
international law,"'1 21 and when a treaty and federal statute conflict, "the one last
in date will control the other."122 Should a federal statute in conflict with a
treaty be the latter in time, courts must nevertheless strive to construe the
112 Id.
113 Id
114 Id
115 Id. at 68.
116 Id
117 Id. at 68-69.
118 Id. at 69.
119 See, e.g., Emprcsa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 479-81 (2d Cir. 2005).
120 Farley, supra note 12, at 69.
121 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("It has also been observed
that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains ... .
122 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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federal statute and treaty provisions in a manner "so as to give effect to both if
that can be done without violating the language of either."' 123
Furthermore, a state may not free itself of its treaty obligations "simply by
overriding them with conflicting domestic legislation."'124 Even if a conflicting
federal statute is passed, the treaty obligations nevertheless remain in effect.125
A state may only free itself from its treaty obligations by following the
withdrawal provisions set forth by the treaty itself.126 A treaty may be abrogated
or modified by a later conflicting federal statute only by express congressional
intent to do so. 2 7
Because Congress has not expressly modified or abrogated the U.S.'s Pan-
American treaty obligations or followed the withdrawal provisions set forth by
the treaty, those obligations remain in full force and effect. 128 With Latin
American entities now owning valuable trademarks being used across the globe,
the likelihood of encountering Article 7 and 8 claims in U.S. courts is no longer
nonexistent Because the U.S. and Cuba are both signatories of the
Convention, U.S. courts can expect to face claims under the Pan-American
Convention brought by Cuban entities, if and when the embargo is repealed-
C. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL RETALIATION FOR FAILURE TO HONOR
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBIAGATIONS
Though ultimately unsuccessful, the policy argument asserted in ITC Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc. in favor of reading sections 44(b) and (h) to incorporate the
famous marks doctrine is a valid one. 129 "The disagreement about how to treat
well-known foreign marks not only threatens the assets of foreign companies
wanting to do business in the United States, but it also erodes the legitimacy of
the United States and its role in supporting a strong global intellectual property
regime.' 130 The same arguments stand for the importance of complying with
international intellectual property law more generally.
In recent decades, the U.S. has actively campaigned other countries,
particularly developing countries with emerging markets, to respect
123 Id.
124 Farley, supra note 12, at 69.
125 Id
126 Id
127 Id.
128 Id
129 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164-65 (2d Cir.), certified question accepted, 8 N.Y.3d
994, 870 N.E.2d 151 (2007), and certiied question answered, 9 N.Y.3d 467, 880 N.E.2d 852 (2007).
130 Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, The Protection of Well-Known Foreign Marks in the United
States: Potential Global Responses to Domestic Ambivalence, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 19
(2012).
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international intellectual property law. 131 By urging foreign nations to respect
U.S.-registered marks despite their lack of use in such countries yet refusing to
offer the same protection for similarly situated foreign marks, the United States
effectively wants all the benefits of an international intellectual property regime
without any of its burdens. The U.S. cannot expect foreign nations to respect
U.S. registered marks without being offered the same protection.1 32 Foreign
nations could retaliate against the United States by refusing to pursue
cancellation of bad faith marks registered in that country under the same name
as a famous mark registered in the U.S.133 Fidel Castro threatened to do just
that nearly fifteen years ago after U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York handed down the Havana Club opinion, which failed to recognize
trademark rights in marks confiscated by the Cuban government.134 The
possibility of similar instances of retaliation jeopardizes carefully developed
global trademarks held by U.S. entities. 135 Retaliatory actions would spark
costly and time-consuming litigation in a foreign jurisdiction with no certain
result as to the litigation's likely outcome. 136
D. THE, CUBAN EMBARGO
Since the embargo's enactment in 1962, U.S. policy towards Cuba has been
twofold: isolating Cuba through economic sanctions and providing
humanitarian support measures for the Cuban people.137 In December 2014,
President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba.138 The
shift "[moved] away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement
and a normalization of relations." 139
The rationale for the shift in U.S. policy is grounded in the view that the last
fifty years of isolation have failed to fulfill the U.S. policy objectives of bringing
131 Id.
132 See generaly id
133 See generally id.
134 Jorge Espinosa, U.S. Trademarks and the New U.S.-Cuba Realky and Its Potential, MIAMI HFRALD
(Jan. 11, 2015), available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/biz-monday/article570
9570.html.
135 Bird & Brown, supra note 130, at 18.
136 Id
137 Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress, Congressional Research Service,
FEDERAT[ION Ov AMERICAN SCIENTIS S (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R439
26.pdf.
138 President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes (Dec. 17,
2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-presid
ent cuba-policy-changes.
139 Sullivan, supra note 137, at i.
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democracy and human rights to Cuba.14° Embargo critics argue that the U.S.'s
isolation policy actually bolsters support for the Castro regime. 141 Castro
blames the suffering of Cuban nationals on the embargo, despite the fact that
Cubans' suffering under the embargo pales in comparison to their suffering
under his oppressive regime.142 The hope is that when the embargo is lifted, the
Castro regime "[will] have no one else to blame for the shortages and stagnation
that will persist without real market reforms."'143 The embargo is a failed
attempt to promote democracy and human rights that effectively "undermined
American influence in Cuba and alienated our allies."'144  The Obama
Administration concluded that engagement would have a greater impact on the
Cuban government and its people. 45
To implement the Obama administration's policy change, the Treasury and
Commerce Departments eased embargo regulations in January 2015 in the areas
of travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. 4 6
Despite easing of regulations, the embargo remains in effect and "can only be
lifted with congressional action or if certain conditions in Cuba are met."47
Although diplomatic relations have been restored and embargo regulations
have been eased, "rebuilding mutual respect for copyrights, trademarks and
other intellectual property is one of the many still-pending issues."'148
Protection of intellectual property rights remains on the agenda for future talks
between U.S. and Cuban diplomats. 49 According to Cuban officials, the
embargo's sanctions "remain so restrictive that discussions of [intellectual
property] protections are premature."'5
140 Id at 24.
141 Daniel Griswold, Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Four
Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba (Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.
cato.org/publications/speeches/four-decades-failure-us-embargo-against-cuba (discussing U.S.
policy toward Cuba at the James A. Baker III Insitte Program, Cuba and the United States in
the 21st Century at Rice University, Houston, Texas).
142 Id
143 Id
144 Id
145 Obama, supra note 138.
146 Sullivan, supra note 131, n.91 at 24 (citing 80 Federal Register 2286-2302,January 16, 2015).
147 Id at i.
148 Nick Miroff, Cubans Pirate U.S. TV and Movies, Saing the Embargo Made Them Do It, WASH.
PosT (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the americas/cubans-pirate-us-
tv-and-movies-saying-the-embargo-made-them-do-it/2015/10/16/0e0068e6-70ff- 1e5-bal4-318
f8e87a2fcstory.html.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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The process of rebuilding mutual respect for trademarks "[will not] be a
smooth one."'' This ugly truth could not be more evident than in the context
of Cuba's most famous export: cigars. Because the U.S. does not recognize
Cuban marks, non-Cuban entities market non-Cuban cigars in the U.S. under
identical marks. 5 2 Thus, "many of the Cuban cigars one can currently buy
abroad would violate trademarks if imported to the U.S."'' If and when
Congress decides to lift the embargo, U.S. and Cuban cigar companies will turn
to U.S. courts to resolve their trademark disputes. 5 4 Congress can make
resolution of these inevitable trademark disputes easier by enacting a modified
concurrent use provision similar to that already present in the Lanham Act,
specifically designed to address Cuban-U.S. trademark disputes resulting from
the embargo.
II. ANALYSIS
Courts may look to the famous marks doctrine to determine standards for
substantive and procedural fairness regarding resolution of trademark
ownership disputes between U.S. and foreign entities. The doctrine
acknowledges that substantive fairness calls for providing protection to a well-
known foreign mark on the basis of its notoriety within the United States,
regardless of whether the mark is used or registered in the United States.155 The
doctrine also recognizes that procedural fairness calls for allowing the owner of
the well-known foreign mark to pursue the benefit of such protection, and
allows him to seek cancellation of the lesser-known mark registered in the
U.S. 156 Although the famous marks doctrine would be of great use to courts as
a fairness guidepost for resolving trademark ownership disputes between U.S.
and Cuban entities, the embargo inhibits the doctrine's utility. The doctrine is
rendered inapplicable by embargo prohibitions precluding Cuban entities
owning well-known Cuban marks from seeking cancellation of conflicting
marks registered in the United States to U.S. entities.
Even if Congress lifted the embargo, its aftermath makes immediate
application of the famous marks doctrine difficult. By keeping Cuban marks at
arm's length, the embargo guarantees a system of conflicting marks should free
trade eventually resume. The predicament is one that U.S. trademark law never
151 Jacob Grier, What Obama's Cuba DealMeans for the Future of Cuban Cigars, REASON.COM (Dec 21,
2014), https://reason.com/archivcs/2014/12/21/what-obamas-cuba-deal-means-for-the-futu.
152 Id.
153 Id.
15 Id
155 Zobel, supra note 14, at 148 (footnote omitted); see also MCCART-Y, supra note 14, § 29:4.
156 Zobel, supra note 14, at 148 (footnote omitted);I see aso MCCA~rTiw, supra note 14, § 29:4.
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would have allowed otherwise. Had the embargo not been in effect, Cuban
entities owning well-known foreign marks could have registered their marks
with the USPTO, or attempted to prevent the registration or seek cancellation
of their marks by U.S. entities. Yet because those actions would constitute a
prohibited transfer of property rights under the embargo, 57 Cuban entities were
forced to watch from afar as U.S. entities obtained valid, lawful U.S.
registrations of well-known Cuban marks.
If and when the embargo is lifted, courts will face the difficult task of
resolving trademark ownership disputes in which no party is at fault, and yet
both parties have everything to lose. On the one hand, there is a Cuban entity
owning a well-known foreign mark recognized by millions both within and
without the United States. On the other hand, there is a U.S. entity that
obtained a valid and lawful registration of the same well-known foreign mark in
the United States under the embargo. Both entities have spent considerable
time and resources to build their marks' notoriety within their respective
territories of use, and both entities want to capitalize on their marks' notoriety
within the U.S. market. But for the embargo, if use of the mark by the Cuban
entity preceded that of the U.S. entity, the U.S. entity could not have registered
its mark in the U.S. The Cuban entity would have had priority to register its
mark or challenge the use or registration of the U.S. entity's interfering mark
under the Pan-American Convention's Article 7.158 Furthermore, there exists
the possibility that the U.S. mark's notoriety was built to some degree on the
Cuban mark's global notoriety and absence in the U.S. market. These
considerations certainly weigh in favor of the Cuban entity.
Nevertheless, we ought not punish the U.S. entity for simply taking
advantage of opportunities afforded to it by U.S. law. Money damages in the
form of royalty fees are not sufficient relief for either party, and injunctive relief
amounts to a zero-sum game-a solution that hardly seems fair given the
current situation. As a result, applying the famous marks doctrine to the
current situation would negate the very tenet of fairness upon which the
doctrine rests.
A. CONCURRENT USE REGISTRATIONS
Fortunately, U.S. trademark law offers tools to avoid such zero-sum
games-including limited trademark protection using concurrent use
registrations. 159 A concurrent use registration is "a restricted registration, with
157 31 C.F.R. § 515.311 (2015).
158 Convention & Protocol Between the United States of Am. & Other Am. Repubics for the Prot. of Trade-
Marks, 46 Stat 2907 (Feb. 27, 1931).
159 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2015).
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conditions and limitations fixed by the Board, as to the mode or place of use of
the applicant's mark or the goods and/or services on or in connection with
which the mark is used."'16 Concurrent use registrations are most often sought
when "parties [use] the same mark on similar goods or services but in separate
territories of the United States.' 1 61  Thus, restrictions on concurrent use
registrations are most often geographical.
Concurrent use registrations may only be issued under two circumstances.1 62
The first is upon the conclusion of a concurrent use proceeding before the
TTAB in which the TTAB has found that the applicant seeking the concurrent
use registration has shown (1) that it used the mark in commerce prior to the
filing of the registration application by the senior user and (2) that "use of the
mark for which it seeks concurrent registration will not result in a likelihood of
confusion.' 63 The second instance in which a concurrent use registration may
be issued is "when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that
more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in
commerce."164
1. Prior Use in Commerce Requirement. Concurrent use registrations are only
available to entities whose use of their mark in interstate commerce preceded
the filing date of their opponent's application for registration.165 The prior use
in commerce requirement focuses on two dates: the date the applicant began
using the mark for which it seeks concurrent use rights and the earliest filing
date of the senior user's application. 66 According to the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board Manual of Procedure, "an application seeking concurrent
registration through a concurrent use proceeding normally must assert a date of
first use in commerce prior to the earliest application filing date of the
application(s)."' 67 However, the prior use requirement need not be met if (1)
the senior user consents to the applicant's concurrent use of the mark or (2) a
court reaches a final determination that multiple entities are entitled to use of
the mark.1 68
160 Chapter 1100: Concurrent Use Proceedings, UNI rrD STATS PATENT & TRADEMARK Oilr[cv, 4,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/appeal/tbmp_3rd ed rev 1 chapter1 100.pdf (last
visited Nov. 19, 2015).
161 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, 5 20:81.
162 Id
163 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(2)(d) (2015).
164 Chapter 1100: Concurrent Use Proceedings, supra note 160, at 8 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 5 1052(2)(d)
(2015)).
165 3 McCARTH Y, supra note 14, 5 20:81.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1052(2)(d) (2015).
167 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP) § 1103.01(b) (2015),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tbmp- 1100.pdf.
168 15 U.S.C. § 1052(2)(d) (2015); see also TBMP § 1103.01(b), supra note 157.
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Furthermore, § 1052(2)(d) requires that the applicant's prior use be lawful. 169
Lawful concurrent use "[arises] when a party, in good faith, and without
knowledge of a prior party's use in another geographic area, adopts and uses the
same or similar mark for the same or similar goods or services within its own
geographic area."' 170 The 'ITAB has held that an applicant's use of "a
substantially identical mark in a remote geographic area with full knowledge of
the senior user's prior use elsewhere" does not constitute lawful concurrent
use.
171
2. Likelihood of Confusion Requirement. In addition to showing prior use in
commerce, an applicant must also show that "confusion, mistake, or deception
is not likely to result from the continued use by more than one person of the
same or similar marks" to obtain a concurrent use registration. 172 When seeking
registration before the TTAB, the Board uses the modem "related goods"
test.173 Under this test, the likelihood of confusion "depends upon whether the
purchasing public would mistakenly assume that the applicant's goods or
services originate with, are sponsored by, or are in some way associated with the
goods sold under a cited registration or trademark."'174 An unsupported
assertion that confusion is unlikely will not meet the requirement. 175 An
applicant must put forth more than the argument that its mark and the prior
registered mark have coexisted in commerce for an extensive period of time
without resulting confusion. 176
When a concurrent use registration is sought via final judicial determination,
courts employ various standards when deciding whether concurrent use would
cause a likelihood of confusion. Each of the thirteen federal circuits has
developed its own list of likelihood of confusion factors,177 All federal circuits
use a balancing test whereby "no one of the foundational factors is
determinative, but rather that all are to be weighed and balanced one against the
other.' 178
169 15 U.S.C. § 1052(2)(d) (2015) (stating "concurrent registrations may be issued to such
persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful
use in commerce" (emphasis added)).
170 TBMP § 1103.01 (d)(2) (2015), available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/docum
ents/tbmp-1100.pdf.
171 Woman's World Shops Inc. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1985 (P.T.O. Jan. 4, 1988); see
also Concurrent Use Registration, WIKTPEDIA, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wild/Concurrent-u
se-rcgistration#cite note-8.
172 15 U.S.C. § 1052(2)(d) (2015).
173 4 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:78.
174 Id
175 Id
176 Id
177 Id § 24:30.
178 Id
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The Federal Circuit, the primary appellate court to receive appeals from the
TTAB, considers thirteen factors set forth in its 1973 opinion in Application of
E. I. DuPont DeNemoury & Co.' 79 The Federal Circuit considers the thirteen
factors as they apply to the goods or services specified in the application for
concurrent use registration,' 8 except when the parties enter an agreement
consenting to the concurrent use.' 81  Not all thirteen DuPont factors will be
relevant to every concurrent use case. 182 Only DuPont factors for which there is
evidence need be considered and discussed by the court or TTAsB.183 However,
"the two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods or services."M
The Federal Circuit has held "that the first DuPont factor, the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks themselves, may be dispositive of the issue,"'185
regardless of the strength of the opposer's registered mark.'8 To determine
similarity and dissimilarity of two marks under the first DuPont factor, the
Federal Circuit considers "not whether the marks can be differentiated in a side-
by-side comparison, but whether they are so similar in their overall commercial
impression that confusion is likely to result.' 1 87 Applying the DuPont factors in
some of its proceedings, the T-'AB "has stressed that: 'The focus is on the
recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general, rather
than a specific, impression of trademarks.' ' ' s
Furthermore, the fifth DuPont factor, the mark's fame, may play a more
significant role in the Federal Circuit's analysis when the prior mark is
notorious. 89 While this factor considers the notoriety of the prior mark, the
Federal Circuit has also held that notoriety of the junior user's mark plays a role
in the court's likelihood of confusion analysis. 9 The Federal Circuit gives full
179 Id. § 24:43 (citing Appcation of E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A.
1973)).
180 4 McCArHy, supra note 14, § 24:43.
181 Id. § 24:43 n.3:30 (quoting Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Although such reasoning [n Du Pon reaches beyond the application, it
does so only to the extent that the parties legally bound themselves to using the mark in their
respective product category.... Such a binding agreement limits the benefits of registration.")).
182 Id
183 Id
184 Id.
185 Id § 24:43.
18 Id § 24:43 n.4 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1142
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
187 Id. 24:43.
188 Id.
189 Id. 24:43 n.6 (citing Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 l.2d 350, 352 (Fed.
Cir. 1992)).
190 Id.
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weight to a mark's notoriety during its analysis, reasoning that "[f]amous marks
are accorded more protection precisely because they are more likely to be
remembered and associated in the public mind than a weaker mark ... "191
Thus, a mark's notoriety may cut in favor of both the applicant and the senior
user.192 The party claiming notoriety of its mark bears the burden of showing
it,19 3 and notoriety will be determined by the "knowledge of third-party marks
by the class of customers and potential customers of the goods or services at
issue, not knowledge by the general public."'194
Because concurrent use registrations are designed to avoid zero-sum games
by placing conditions and limitations on the use of the mark upon a showing of
likelihood of confusion and prior use in commerce, concurrent use registrations
provide a good starting point for formulating a plan to resolve U.S.-Cuban
trademark disputes. But they are a starting point in every sense of the word.
Concurrent use registrations, as they are currently written, cannot be readily
applied to U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes due to the unique situation created by
the embargo, and many modifications are necessary for the concurrent use
registration scheme to effectively address these disputes.
B. CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS TO UTILIZING CONCURRENT USE
REGISTRATIONS IN U.S.-CUBAN TRADEMARK OWNERSHIP DISPUTES
Concurrent use registrations seemingly offer a viable solution to U.S.-Cuban
trademark disputes. However, multiple administrative barriers prevent
successful application of concurrent use registrations to the unique situation
characterizing these disputes.
1. Prior Use Requirement. The difficultly with the prior use in commerce
requirement is that the majority of Cuban entities cannot show prior use due to
the embargo. The embargo prohibits the transfer of property rights between
persons and entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and Cuba. 195
Cuban entities that developed valuable trademarks after the embargo took
effect could not use those trademarks in the U.S. marketplace. As a result,
Cuban entities cannot demonstrate that use of their mark in interstate
commerce preceded the filing date of the U.S. entity's application for
registration. Thus, concurrent use registrations-as currently interpreted and
issued by the TTAB-are unavailable to Cuban mark owners.
191 Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cit. 2000).
192 4 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:43.
193 Id
194 Id. (citing Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d
1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
195 31 C.F.R. 515.201 (2015).
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2. Incontestabiliy of Prior Registered Mark- Because the embargo has been in
effect for more than five years, many marks registered with the PTO to U.S.
entities are likely incontestable marks. 196 Incontestable marks registered to U.S.
entities result in limited relief options for Cuban entities. Once a registration
becomes incontestable "the evidentiary value of the registration from a prima
fade presumption of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark to
'conclusive evidence' of such a right."'197 Many of the U.S.-registered marks in
conflict with Cuban-owned marks are now incontestable due to the fact that
their registrations have gone unchallenged for well over five years under the
embargo. Therefore, many Cuban entities are already precluded from
challenging the U.S. mark's registration.
Although incontestable registration creates conclusive evidence of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the mark, it does not mean that the
registration cannot be challenged as the name would suggest. 198 Incontestable
registrations may not be cancelled based on prior use, but a challenger may
nevertheless seek an injunction barring the mark's use within a particular
territory.199 While injunctive relief is an option for Cuban entities challenging
registered marks in the U.S., it still does not allow the Cuban entity to seek the
protection that registration offers.
C. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION ALLOWING FOR TIE UTILIZATION OF
CONCURRENT USE REGISTRATIONS IN U.S.-CUBAN IRADEMARK DISPUTES
Because concurrent use provisions as currently interpreted by the TTAB are
inapplicable to Cuban entities, Congress should pass modified concurrent use
provisions to appropriately resolve U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes. This
modified approach should eliminate the barriers for Cuban entities seeking
concurrent use registrations, while also honor the equitable interests of U.S.
entities owning the same or similar marks.
196 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2015).
A registration becomes 'incontestable' if, after the fifth year of registration, the
registrant files an affidavit avowing that there have been no adverse decisions
regarding the registrant's right to use the mark, that no such proceedings are
pending, and that the mark has been in continuous use for five consecutive
years.
Keith A. Barritt, Prior User vs. Federal Re gistrant: Whose Mark Is It, Arjway?, FISH & RICHARDSON
LLP (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.fr.com/news/prior-user-vs-federal-registrant-whose-mark-is-it-
anyway 1/.
197 Barritt, supra note 196.
198 Id.
19'9 Id.
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First, the incontestability right of U.S. registrants would be set aside
temporarily to allow Cuban entities to seek a concurrent use registration. These
U.S. marks may be incontestable simply because the Cuban entity owning the
mark abroad could not seek registration in the U.S., or oppose the registration
of the U.S. entity due to the embargo. Thus, U.S. entities arguably obtained this
incontestability right in an underhanded manner, and fairness requires
temporarily suspending that right. Moreover, to allow Cuban entities to seek
concurrent use registrations while attempting to honor the lawfully obtained
incontestability rights of U.S. entities, a Cuban entity's ability to overcome the
incontestability bar should be limited in time. Cuban entities may seek a
concurrent use registration for what would otherwise be an incontestable mark
only before a particular date specified in the modified provision. After that
specified date, the U.S. entity's incontestability right will be reinstated, barring
the issuance of a concurrent use registration. Furthermore, the Cuban entity
seeking the concurrent use registration must demonstrate that it is a Cuban
national who was unable to reach the USPTO due to embargo restrictions.
Second, the modified concurrent use provision will continue to give the
TTAB director broad discretion in determining restrictions for concurrent use
registrations. Section 1052(d) currently states, "in issuing concurrent
registrations, the Director shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the
mode or place of use of the mark or the goods on or in connection with which
such mark is registered to the respective persons."" Thus, there are three
types of "conditions and limitations" that may justify a concurrent use
proceeding- mode of use of the mark, place of use of the mark, and the
description of goods associated with the mark.2 1 Concurrent use proceedings
are generally limited by the TTAB to "situations where the proposed
'conditions and limitations' cannot be incorporated into the drawing of the
mark or the identification of goods, and thus cannot be considered under the
main clause of Lanham Act § 2(d)." 202 Because federal trademark registration
ordinarily provides nationwide protection, territorial limitations are the only
"conditions and limitations" that "cannot be incorporated into the
identification of [an] applicant's goods or services, and cannot be considered
under the basic likelihood of confusion analysis set forth in the main clause of
Section 2(d). ' '203 As a result, concurrent use proceedings most commonly
involve "place of use" restrictions because other proposed restrictions are most
often addressed in ex parte or inter partes proceedings.20 4
- 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).
201 3 MCCARTI-Y, supra note 14, § 20:87.
202 Id. (citing Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 n.9 (P.T.O. Mar. 21, 1995)).
-3 Id (citing Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 n.9 (P.T.O. Mar. 21, 1995)).
2M See Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 n.9 (P.T.O. Mar. 21, 1995).
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However, post-embargo U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes present a unique
situation in that they will most likely involve "mode of use" restrictions rather
than "place of use" restrictions. "Place of use" restrictions and goods
description restrictions would be insufficient to resolve the trademark disputes
at hand. "Place of use" restrictions fail to further the goal of resolving U.S.-
Cuban trademark disputes, which is to respect the priority rights of the U.S.-
owned and Cuban-owned marks to the fullest extent possible. Such restrictions
would rob the U.S. entity of geographic markets that it lawfully enjoys and stiff
the Cuban entity of full enjoyment of U.S. intrastate commerce, a right it would
otherwise be entitled to under international law but for the embargo.
Furthermore, description of goods restrictions would be inappropriate in many
U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes because the mark at issue likely will relate to the
same product cigars or rum.
Thus, the most likely "condition" or "limitation" to be proposed in U.S.-
Cuban trademark disputes will be one restricting the mark's "mode of use," or
how the goods or services on which the mark is used are presented or sold. - In
addition, the proposed "mode of use" restriction is likely impossible to
incorporate into the mark itself. These trademark disputes will arise because
the exact same mark is registered to a U.S. entity within the United States and to
a Cuban outside the U.S. Both entities have spent considerable time and
resources developing and marketing nearly identical marks, albeit in different
markets. As a result, neither entity wants to substantially change its mark.
In this situation, a "mode of use" restriction in the form of disclaimers or
limited marketing channels should be sufficient to dispel any likelihood of
confusion and grant a concurrent use registration. The TTAB has previously
held disclaimers suffident.205 Thus, the TTAB could require the Cuban and/or
U.S. entities to place disclaimers on one or both entity's goods, stating which
entity is marketing the particular goods.
Additionally, the TTAB would impose a restriction in the form of limited
marketing channels to grant a concurrent use registration. Limiting available
marketing channels could take a variety of forms such as limiting one entity's
right to market its goods in airports, restricting one entity's right to market its
goods via the Intemet,206 prohibiting one entity's ability to sell its goods in large
205 See, e.g., 3 MCCARIFY, supra note 14, § 20:85.50 (citing CDS, Inc. v. ICE. Mgmt., Inc., 80
U.S.P.Q.2d 1572, 1584 (P.T.O. July 6, 2006)) (finding "that the junior user's Web site disclaimer
to the public that it did business in only some territories would be sufficient to prevent a
likelihood of confusion").
206 While restricting one entity's internet sales is an available "mode of use" restriction, it would
face strong opposition from Cuban entities. Imposing such a restriction would likely require
considering which entity has been utilizing Internet sales for the longest and allowing whichever
entity has been using the Internet the longest to continue that use. Cuban entities have been
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retail outlets such as Walmart, or impeding one entity's ability to market its
goods within a specified radius of the other entity's distribution centers. By
applying the current language of Section 1052(d) to the modified concurrent use
provisions, the TTAB director will maintain the broad discretion to craft the
appropriate restriction for a justified concurrent use registration.
Third, the TTAB's policy reserving concurrent use proceedings "for those
situations where the proposed 'conditions and limitations' cannot be
incorporated into the drawing of the mark or the identification of goods, and
thus cannot be considered under the main clause of Lanham Act § 2(d)" will be
temporarily suspended when addressing U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes. 2° 7 The
TTAB currently declines to hold concurrent use proceedings where likelihood
of confusion can be eliminated by incorporating "conditions and limitations"
into the marks and identification of goods or services of the involved parties.20 8
In such situations, the TFAB finds that the likelihood of confusion
determination should be reached via the USPTO's usual hearing process.2° 9
The ITAB considers instituting a concurrent use proceeding for purposes of
determining likelihood of confusion "futile. '210 It reasons that if the described
"conditions and limitations" able to be incorporated into the mark insufficiently
eliminate the likelihood of confusion under the main clause of Section 2(d),
then the "conditions and limitations" will also be insufficient under the
concurrent use provision.21' Thus, the ITAB reserves concurrent use
proceedings for situations in which the likelihood of confusion issue "cannot be
fully or accurately adjudicated, under the main clause of Section 2(d)" through
traditional ex parte and inter partes proceedings. 212
However, the embargo's precluding the Cuban entity from registering its
own mark or opposing or cancelling the registration of the U.S. entity's mark
warrants temporarily suspending this requirement. The Cuban entity, having
circulated its mark outside the U.S. in a certain design and manner, should not
be precluded from seeking a concurrent use registration when conditions or
limitations able to be incorporated into the mark would easily eliminate the
likelihood of confusion and when international treaty rights dismissed by U.S.
precluded from utilizing the Internet due to the embargo and the Cuban government's own
policies regarding Internet use. Under the likely analysis, Cuban entities would continue to be
disadvantaged.
207 3 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 20:87 (citing Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (P.T.O. Mar.
21, 1995)).
- Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (P.T.O. Mar. 21, 1995).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
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courts in the name of the embargo would entitle the Cuban entity to
unrestricted use of that mark within the U.S.
Furthermore, in the same decision, its policy of finding concurrent use
proceedings inappropriate for situations in which "conditions and limitations"
were incorporated or able to be incorporated into the mark, the TTAB noted:
concurrent use proceedings conceivably might be appropriate
when the proposed conditions and limitations consist of certain
"mode of use" restrictions which are not part of the mark itself,
and thus cannot be incorporated into the drawing of the mark or
considered as part of the basic likelihood of confusion analysis
under the main clause of Section 2(d).213
Examples include "an agreed-to use only with a defined house mark or trade
dress or only with a disclaimer. ' 214 In such situations, the TrAB noted that,
"[t]he only way to consider the effect of these restrictions on the mode of use
of applicant's mark is in the context of a concurrent use proceeding." 215
Because the "conditions and limitations" placed on the Cuban entity's mark are
likely to be "mode of use" restrictions, Cuban entities are unlikely to run up
against the ITAB's traditional approach requiring likelihood of confusion to be
determined by proceedings other than concurrent use proceedings.
However, cases involving "mode of use" restrictions are rare and are
"almost always" the result of a final judicial determination.216 Thus, concurrent
use registrations with "mode of use" restrictions "[are] usually confined to cases
where a court in litigation has determined that difference in format or setting
preclude the likelihood of confusion and that the PTO will grant a registration
with 'conditions and limitations' other than those of territory."217
The ITAB could be hesitant to grant a concurrent use registration with
"mode of use" restrictions without first being directed to do so by a final
judicial determination. Thus, the modified concurrent use provisions should
explicitly state that the TTAB is given broad discretion to craft restrictions for
concurrent use registrations and that such broad discretion includes, but is not
limited to, the ability to craft "mode of use" restrictions without being
prompted to do so by a court's equitable decree.
213 Id. at n.9.
214 3 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 20:87 (citing Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, n.9 (P.T.O.
Mar. 21, 1995)).
215 Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, n.9 (P.T.O. Mar. 21, 1995).
216 3 McCART-r, supra note 14, § 20:87 (citing Tamarkin Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 n.9
(P.T.O. Mar. 21, 1995)).
217 Id
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Fourth, the modified concurrent use provisions would explicitly state that
certain "mode of use" restrictions such as disclaimers and designated market
channels are presumptively sufficient to prevent a likelihood of confusion. This
modification is in response to the TrAB's possible hesitation to grant "mode of
use" restrictions and the odds that the goods on which the mark is placed will
likely be similar, if not identical. This modification emphasizes the importance
of resolving U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes in a manner that allows both marks
to coexist easily in the U.S. marketplace while honoring both entities' rights to
the greatest extent possible.
Fifth, appeals from the TTAB's final decision in a concurrent use
proceeding involving U.S. and Cuban entities will be before the Eleventh
Circuit or the Federal Circuit. Limiting available forums for appeals better
ensures that the modified concurrent use provisions will be interpreted more
consistently. The Eleventh Circuit is an optimal choice when deciding where
the appeal should lie due to its proximity to Cuba. Its close proximity to Cuba
will make travel to and from the U.S. easier for Cuban entities. The Eleventh
Circuit is also where the majority of U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes will arise,
because Cuban goods will likely primarily be circulated in Florida. In addition,
the U.S. entities involved in trademark disputes with Cuban entities, such as
rum and cigar manufacturers, will likely have primary offices located in Florida.
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit is an optimal forum to hear appeals from concurrent
use proceedings involving U.S. and Cuban entities. In addition, the Federal
Circuit is the primary appellate court to entertain appeals from ITAB decisions,
making it a desirable second forum to entertain U.S.-Cuban concurrent use
appeals.
Finally, the modified concurrent use provisions would exclusively apply to
trademark disputes between U.S. and Cuban entities. Current concurrent use
registration statutes sufficiently resolve trademark disputes between U.S. and
non-Cuban entities. They are designed to resolve normal trademark disputes
between U.S. entities and foreign entities with whom the U.S. maintains normal
relations. However, trademark disputes between U.S. and Cuban entities are
not routine trademark disputes. U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes have been
complicated by crumbled diplomatic relations and a fifty-year trade embargo.
The unusual nature of U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes highlights the need for
modified concurrent use provisions as unique as the disputes they are designed
to resolve. Because current concurrent use statutes effectively resolve normal
trademark disputes, there is no need to fix a system that is not broken. Rather,
modified concurrent use provisions that exclusively address U.S.-Cuban
trademark disputes aim to resolve these unique disputes in the present so that
U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes may be easily resolved by normal concurrent
use statutes in the future.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Recent normalization between the U.S. and Cuba has raised questions about
what a post-embargo world will look like for these two countries. If and when
the embargo is repealed, it will leave behind a mess of conflicting trademarks
rightfully used by both U.S. and Cuban entities.
Ordinarily, established domestic trademark law and international treaties
would provide guidance for how to resolve this unique conflict. Under the
Paris Convention's famous marks doctrine, a well-known foreign mark would
receive protection on the basis of its notoriety within the United States,
regardless of whether the mark is used or registered in the United States. In
addition, the Pan American Convention's priority rights provisions would allow
foreign mark owners to challenge the use or registration of an interfering mark
upon a showing that the interfering mark's owner knew of the foreign mark's
existence and continuous use before adopting the interfering mark in the U.S.
However, the embargo has created a unique situation that renders the
usefulness of these principles moot. Cuban entities cannot show use of their
mark within the U.S. to bring a claim under the famous marks doctrine, and
they cannot seek registration or cancellation of their marks under either the
famous marks doctrine or the priority rights provisions because such action
would amount to a prohibited transfer of ownership under the embargo. While
the famous marks doctrine and priority provisions serve as guiding principles
for a possible post-embargo solution, they are of little use for crafting an
immediate solution in the present.
A more immediate post-embargo solution lies in concurrent use provisions
already set forth in U.S. trademark law. However, these provisions are not
without their own barriers preventing successful immediate application to post-
embargo U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes. Many Cuban entities will be unable
to show prior use of the mark within the U.S. as required by the provisions, and
many of the U.S. marks Cuban entities will seek to cancel will be found
incontestable.
The solution to resolving U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes, therefore, lies in
modified concurrent use provisions designed specifically and exclusively to
address trademark disputes between entities of these two countries. The
proposed modified concurrent use provisions include setting aside the
incontestability defense that would otherwise be available to U.S. entities;
continuing to grant the TrAB director broad discretion to determine
restrictions for concurrent use registrations; temporarily suspending TTAB's
policy of reserving concurrent use registrations for situations in which
conditions and limitations on the marks' use cannot be incorporated into the
drawing of the; presuming "mode of use" restrictions sufficient to dispel a
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likelihood of confusion; and channeling appeals from final TTAB decisions
regarding concurrent use registrations to the Eleventh and Federal Circuits.
The final and most important proposed modification is that the previous
proposed modifications will exclusively apply to concurrent use registration
proceedings involving U.S. and Cuban entities. This final proposed
modification furthers the goal of normalization. Modified concurrent use
provisions that exclusively address U.S.-Cuban trademark disputes aim to
resolve these unique disputes in the pre-concurrent use statutes in the future,
thereby helping restore normal relations between the two countries.
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